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The Single Economic Entity Doctrine in EU Competition 
Law 
Focused on applying single economic entity doctrine in relation to merger control of State 
Owned Enterprises  
 
Abstract  
This thesis focuses on the issues surrounding single economic entity doctrine in relation to State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), in particular on the effects of Article 22 of the Preamble of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (EUMR), and 
the Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings. Together these documents set the standards for merger 
control practice concerning SOEs. They are centred around the principle of applying the single 
economic entity doctrine when identifying the turnover of SOEs and when determining the jurisdiction 
of the Commission. The thesis possesses two major goals. The primary goal of the thesis is to elucidate 
the criteria used for the determination of a single economic unit (single economic entity) with 
independent decision-making power in the public sector. To this end, in chapter 3, the author has 
synthetized a list of the relevant criteria used for the determination of an economic entity, based on the 
criteria used by the Commission that have emerged over the course of its long-term decision-making 
practice. In chapter 4, the author examines whether there is any discrimination against SOEs owned by 
third countries. This chapter is based on an analysis of decisions concerning Chinese and Russian SOEs 
and a comparison of the criteria used for single-entity determination in these cases with the criteria 
employed in the decisions concerning EEA SOEs, as listed in chapter 3. The author concludes that he 
did not find any indication of discriminatory criteria being imposed on the examined third-country 
SOEs. Chapter 5 provides a closer analysis of Chinese SOEs, as the assessment of their independence 
arises as one of the most striking challenges of recent European merger control practice. The author 
compares his findings on the governance of Chinese SOEs with criteria for the determination of 
independence and suggests that as a result of coordination via The Communist Party of China, Chinese 
SOEs might be part of one broad economic entity.  
 
The secondary goal of the thesis is to predict the possible impact of an SOE being considered a part of 
a broader economic entity under the EUMR regime on the application of the other branches of EU 
competition law on the SOE in question. The author examines, in particular, the (non)applicability of 
Art 101 TFEU on internal interactions between SOEs constituting a single economic entity. It can be 
concluded that in such cases Art 101 TFEU is in principle non-applicable. The author also examines the 
accountability of parent entities for EU competition law breaches perpetrated by their subsidiaries. It can 
be concluded that attributing liability to parent entities is possible even in cases when the parent entity 
is a public body of a third state (such as Chinese SASAC), provided it forms a single economic entity 
with the subsidiary which has breached EU competition law rules. The author finds the single economic 
entity doctrine to be a suitable instrument for the analysis of market structure. Therefore, the approach 
towards the single entity doctrine in the public sector should not be modified and should remain as it is. 
The author suggests that emerging fears in relation to the increasing influence of several third countries 
would preferably be tackled by protective measures from distinct areas of EU law, as this approach 
would not impede the effectiveness of the single economic entity doctrine as a market structure 
indicator.   
 
